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“As man advances in civilization, and small tribes are united into 
larger communities, the simplest reason would tell each individual 
that he ought to extend his social instincts and sympathies to all the 
members of the same nation, though personally unknown to him. 
This point being once reached, there is only an artificial barrier to 
prevent his sympathies extending to men of all nations and races.” 
 
—Charles Darwin1 
 
                                                 
1.   Robin Wright, Nonzero: The Logic of Human Destiny iii 
(Pantheon Books 2000). 
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“The whole world is coming, 
A nation is coming, a nation is coming, 
The eagle has brought the message to the tribe. 
The father says so, the father says so. 
Over the whole earth they are coming. 
The buffalo are coming, the buffalo are coming, 
The Crow has brought the message to the tribe, 
The father says so, the father says so.” 
 
—Sioux Ghost Dance Chant2 
INTRODUCTION 
A. The Twin Founding of Indian and Non-Indian America 
 
  Two Americas–one Indian and one non-Indian-were 
simultaneously created in what constitutional scholar Martin 
Becker calls that “privileged moment” which witnessed, in the late 
eighteenth century, the founding of the world’s first constitutional 
republic-the United States of America.3 That privileged moment 
also postulated the future co-existence of two radically differing 
future visions-one non-Indian and one Indian-of American civil 
society. The non-Indian version of American civil society was 
consciously constructed as “a merely rationalistic instrumental 
entity.”4 As renowned constitutional scholar David Epstein puts it, 
the American constitutional republic was founded as the practical 
answer to the long-standing Lockean riddle that asked why 
inherently free and sovereign individuals would act in concert to 
“secure . . . this end that individuals out of fear and prudence, 
[would] join together to form a civil society in the first place.” 
Constitutional scholar Steven Conrad likewise views the American 
                                                 
2.  Frederick Turner, Beyond Geography: The Western Spirit 
Against Wilderness 290 (Viking Press 1980). 
3.  Stephen A. Conrad, The Rhetorical Constitution of “Civil 
Society” at the Founding: One Lawyer’s Anxious Vision, 72 IND. L. J. 335, 
335-36 (1997). 
4. Id. at 339. 
  
 
2015      RECONSIDERING THE ORIGINAL FOUNDING       177 
 
 
republic “as an agen[t] of libertarian revolution,” given that it was 
consciously born of non-Indians’ “self interest, prudence or fear.5 It 
was, in Conrad’s assessment, a deliberately adopted political 
recourse to those known and failed historical examples of civil 
society that the non-Indian settlers of America had purposely left 
behind in the Old World.6  
 A competing Indian version of American civil society was 
simultaneously established by the founding of the American 
constitutional republic in the late eighteenth century. While Indians 
are briefly mentioned in the American constitution,7 it was left to 
Chief Justice John Marshall to develop federal common law 
principles that, based on his socio-legal analysis regarding the 
nature and character of Indian civil society at the time of the 
founding of the American republic, would lay the foundation for 
future legal and political intercourse between the non-Indian and 
Indian peoples of America.8 Marshall’s assessment of the Indian 
people’s inherent character as “fierce savages, whose occupation 
was war, and whose subsistence was drawn chiefly from the 
forest,”9 demanded the establishment of a politically and 
geographically separate “Indian America.” What was the practical 
political and legal result, at least from the non-Indians’ viewpoint, 
                                                 
5.  Id. 
6.  Id. 
7.  “Indians not taxed” are excluded, by Article I sec. 2 of the 
Constitution, from being counted for legislative apportionment purposes. 
Congress is specifically empowered, by Article I sec. 8 of the Constitution, to 
“regulate Commerce... with the Indian tribes.” U.S. Const. art. I, §§ 2, 8. 
8.  Chief Justice John Marshall’s process of incorporating the 
Indian peoples and their lands with the America domestic sphere of control 
was accomplished over the course his opinions in what is popularly called 
Marshall’s Indian Law Trilogy: Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823) 
(incorporating aboriginal Indian land titles into federal ownership); Cherokee 
Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831) (denominating Indian tribes as “domestic, 
dependent nations”); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 51 (1832) (establishing an 
exclusive, bilateral relationship between the federal government and the 
Indian peoples). 
9.  21 U.S. at 590. 
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that followed from Marshall’s judicially perceived “actual state of 
things?”10 
B. Why Chief Justice John Marshall Excluded Indian Peoples 
from the Future Civic Life of the American Republic 
 
 Marshall’s Indian law opinions justified the Founders’ 
“politically re-imagined”11 American civil society, consciously 
excluding Indians from any role within the future civic life of the 
new American republic. He gave this answer to his own rhetorical 
question: “[w]hat was the inevitable consequence of this actual state 
of things?” in the following manner “[t]he Europeans were under 
the necessity of either abandoning the country, and relinquishing 
their pompous claims to it, or enforcing those claims by the sword, 
and by the adoption of principles adapted to the condition of a 
peoples with whom it was impossible to mix, and who could not be 
governed as a distinct society, or of remaining in their 
neighborhood, and exposing themselves and their families to the 
perpetual hazard of being massacred.”12  The non-Indian Founders’ 
rationally-based “prudence and fear” therefore justified, as 
Marshall’s Trilogy13 expressly declared, the intentional exclusion of 
Indian peoples from any role in the civic life of the newly founded 
American constitutional republic. My essay argues for a new 
dialogue between the Indian and non-Indian peoples that will lead 
to the re-negotiation of their contemporary legal and political 
relationship, free of the overweening climate of non-Indian “fear 
and prudence” that doomed the hope for any such reasonable 
dialogue between these two peoples in the late eighteenth 
century.14 
                                                 
10.  Id. 
11.  Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on 
the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (rev. ed. 1991). 
12.   21 U.S. at 590 (emphasis added). 
13.  See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
14.  Conrad, supra note 3, at 339-40. 
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C. Can “Real” and “Artificial” Political Communities Speak 
To One Another? 
 
 Some contemporary moral and legal scholars would 
question whether such a dialogue between the Indian and non-
Indian peoples is any more possible today than it was some two 
hundred years ago. Professor Paul S. Berman characterizes 
America’s Indian peoples as living in real communities while 
America’s non-Indian peoples reside in artificial communities.15 
Real communities, in Berman’s terms, are based on their members’ 
tangible and palpable relationships that arise directly from their 
interlaced and intertwined blood and kinship ties. Artificial 
communities, in Berman’s assessment, are based on their members’ 
voluntary agreement to organize a society based on rational 
concepts so as to realize rational goals.16 The famed American 
pragmatist philosopher, Richard Rorty, seemingly agrees with 
Berman when he concludes that legitimate legal and social 
communication between real and artificial societies is practicably 
impossible.17 According to Rorty, the members of a given discourse 
community are imprisoned by their community’s ruling 
assumptions and dominant informational systems. 
The individual members’ behavior and conduct are 
governed by what Rorty calls “a logic of action,” accessible to, and 
understood by, only those who are bona fide members of that 
community.18 
D. How the Indian Peoples May Re-Negotiate Their Compact 
with the Non-Indian Peoples of America 
 
 But my renegotiated civil compact between the Indian and 
non-Indian peoples does not demand that either party fully 
                                                 
15.  Paul S. Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. 
PA. L. REV. 311 (2003). 
16.  Id. at 461. 
17.  Donald G. Ellis, Crafting Society: Ethnicity, Class and 
Communication Theory 141 (1999). 
18.  Id. 
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appreciate or understand, much less embrace and practice, the 
more exotic or troubling customs or traditions of their respective 
societies. My far less demanding, re-imagined, new civil compact 
between the Indian and non-Indian peoples requires only—in its 
first iteration, at least—that they accord mutual and reciprocal legal 
and political respect to the underlying values and practices that 
define the character of their respective societies. 
 Instilling and enforcing such mutual and reciprocal respect, 
as among the diverse ethnic and cultural groups inhabiting multi-
ethnic America, is viewed by contemporary political philosophers 
John Rawls and Michael Walzer as the sine qua non for the political 
maintenance and moral development of that civil society.19 
Whether my re-imagined civil compact between the Indian and 
non-Indian peoples will mature into its final, and far more 
demanding, political and legal state, will depend on the success 
enjoyed by my hypothesized agential revolution in the re-founded 
American civil society.20 
 
 
                                                 
19.  Michael Walzer, Thick And Thin: Moral Arguments at 
Home and Abroad (1994); John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971). 
20.  Victoria McGeer, Hope, Power and Governance: Why 
Institutionalize Hope? 592 Annals 100, 105 (March 2004). Professor McGeer 
takes a poetic approach to her description of human agential development: 
“[H]uman agency is about imaginatively exploring our own powers, as much 
as it is about using them. Hence, it is about imaginatively exploring what can 
and cannot do in the world. To be effective agents, we must of course learn to 
negotiate this world within certain constraints. But equally, it seems we must 
learn to experience our own limitations... [H]ope is the energy and direction 
we are able to give, not just toward making the world as we want it to be but 
also toward the regulation and  development of our own agency. In hoping, we 
create a kind of imaginative scaffolding that calls for the creative exercise of 
our capacities and so, often, for their development... It is crucial to take a 
reflective and developmental stance toward our own capacities as agents-
hence, it is to experience ourselves as agents of potential as well as agents in 
fact.” 
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E. Why the Second Founding Of American Civil Society Must 
Be Based On Principles of Deep Diversity 
 
 While my short-term goal is to merely improve, through a 
newly established reciprocal and mutually respectful dialogue, the 
present legal and social relations between the Indian and non-
Indian peoples, my long-term goal is more ambitious in its scope 
and reach. By renegotiating, per my proposed agential terms, the 
existing civil compact between the Indian and non-Indian peoples, I 
hope to foster the authentic development of what social 
anthropologist, Clifford Geertz, calls “deep diversity.”21 Professor 
Geertz calls for a new political and legal dialogue as among the 
world’s differing and plural, ethnic and cultural minorities and 
majorities.22 He believes such a new and broad gauged dialogue will 
engender new political and legal understandings as among today’s 
rival ethnic and religious groups. Only such a dialogue, in Geertz’s 
estimation, will produce those new legal and political institutions 
essential for the peaceful mediation of those ethnic and cultural 
tensions inherent in our increasingly diverse, but, nonetheless, 
inexorably interconnected world.23 
 Rather than accept the future globalized “clashes of 
cultures,” that some political pessimists forecast as both inevitable 
and necessary so as to establish the dominance of the Western 
world’s way of life, he calls for alternative dialogic action that will 
hopefully result in new specific, localized legal and political 
institutions and practices. Only these new practices and institutions 
will enable differing political and social cultures to navigate in what 
has become a “splintered and disassembled” modern world.24 
 But Geertz requires the interlocutors who participate in this 
new dialogue to meet a high standard. Their dialogue must embody 
“[n]ew ways [of thinking] that are responsive to particularities, to 
individualities, oddities, contrasts, and singularities, responsive to 
                                                 
21.  Clifford Geertz, Available Light: Anthropological 
Reflections on Philosophical Topics 218-63 (2000). 
22.  Id. at 224. 
23.  Id. at 222. 
24.  Id. at 227-31. 
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what Charles Taylor has called ‘deep diversity,’ a plurality of ways 
of belonging and being, and that yet can draw from them—from 
it—sense of connectedness that is neither uniform nor 
comprehensive, primal nor changeless, but nonetheless real.”25  My 
short-term goal in my essay is to set the terms of new “specific and 
localized” dialogues as between the Indian and non-Indian peoples 
of America. My long-term goal is to encourage the growth and 
development of an authentic “deep diversity” that will, in its 
mature state, hopefully embrace all of America’s present and 
emerging ethnic and cultural minorities within the terms and tenor 
of my proposed new civil compact.26 
F. Can The Indian Peoples Foster The Agential Revolution? 
 
 How do I propose to achieve my envisioned short and long 
term goals?  By up-dating and re-negotiating, in agentialist terms, 
the original Indian civil compact that was declared by Chief Justice 
Marshall in his famed Trilogy of Indian Law Opinions. Three key 
agential factors will play a major role in the development of this 
new compact between the Indian and non-Indian peoples: 
educational agency, political agency and legal agency. If these three 
agential factors are accorded due regard and weight in the 
renegotiation of the Indian people’s compact with America, then, I 
believe, new and re-imagined American civic institutions, ones that 
are based on the principles of authentic deep diversity, can 
emerge.27 
                                                 
25.  Id. at 224. 
26.  Id. at 246. 
27.  McGeer, supra note 20, at 123. Professor McGeer again 
offers an evocative image of such a political community: “How is such a 
community to be achieved? Practically speaking, the most effective course 
may be to cultivate in oneself an interpersonal capacity for attending to the 
cares and concerns of others, thus seeing them as struggling hopeful agents in 
their own right who require support from others if their own hopeful energy is 
not to flag and die ...Hoping well thus involves cultivating a meta-disposition 
in which some of one’s hopeful energy becomes directed towards supporting 
the hopeful agency of others...” 
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 In Part two of my essay I describe the terms and conditions 
of the original Indian compact that historically defined the legal and 
political relations between the Indian and non-Indian peoples of 
America. In Part three of my essay I articulate the new agential 
terms of relationship that will form the basis of my re-negotiated 
civil compact between the Indian and non-Indian peoples of 
America. In Part four of my essay of I extend the agential principles 
embodied in this new civil compact so as to embrace the human 
needs and group aspirations of America’s other existing and 
emerging ethnic groups and other cultural minorities. In my 
conclusion, I reflect on the past two hundred years of political and 
legal relations between the Indian and non-Indian peoples of 
America and I look forward to the next two hundred years of civic 
relationship, hopefully based on the agential principles that I have 
articulated in my essay. 
 
I. WHY “BELONGING” TO AMERICA MATTERS TO 
THE INDIAN AND NON-INDIAN PEOPLE 
A. Why the Political Mythology of “Belonging” Is So 
Important To Both the Indian and Non-Indian Peoples of 
America 
 
That “privileged moment” which witnessed the founding of the 
American constitutional republic in the late eighteenth century also 
established two fundamentally distinct civil compacts that define 
how the Indian peoples, on the one hand, and non-Indian people, 
on the other hand, belong to America. This twin founding of Indian 
and non-Indian America is most appropriately told—not in the 
dreary tomes written by constitutional law scholars or the drab 
scientific texts written by Indian anthropologists or 
ethnographers—but by the respective “creation myths” these 
people offer to justify the great individual and collective sacrifices 
demanded by the founding of the shared America we know and 
love today. 
 Such grievous sacrifices as were necessitated by this twin 
founding of America can only be fully portrayed, as well as 
accepted by the human heart, when they are elevated to the mythic 
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level of a common and shared American destiny. I strive to tell 
these two people’s “myth of American belonging” so that we can 
perhaps finally understand, and thus accept, the sacrifice of blood 
and life that accompanied the twin founding of America.28 
B. How the Restoration of the “Thunderbirds” To the Hidatsa 
Indians’ Rightful Custody Brought Back the Rain to 
Drought Stricken North Dakota 
 
 Some seventy years ago the tribal elders of the Hidatsa 
water buster clan agitated for the Heye Museum in New York City 
to return their sacred thunderbirds to their custody on the Fort 
Berthold Reservation in western North Dakota. The thunderbirds 
are the skulls of the water-busters clan’s tribal ancestors. Along 
with their associated funerary items and medicine bundles the 
thunderbirds balanced the seasons and connected the Hidatsa 
people to their surrounding physical and cultural landscapes within 
their traditional homelands along the bottomlands of the Missouri 
River. 
  Coincident with the tribal elders’ latest campaign for the 
thunderbirds’ return, the worst drought and dust bowl on record 
had enveloped the farms and ranches of 1930s western North 
Dakota. It was the theft of the thunderbirds that brought this 
situation to pass, the Hidatsa elders told an incredulous non-Indian 
public. Only their safe return would end this state of affairs and 
bring the rains back to the parched farm and ranch lands of western 
North Dakota. The Heye Museum in New York City, stung by the 
mounting congressional and public criticism, finally relented and 
agreed to return the thunderbirds to the water buster clan on the 
Fort Berthold Reservation. 
 The “rest of the story,” as radio commentator Paul Harvey 
would put it, was told in a full page Sunday comics spread in the 
Bismarck Tribune. “Ripley’s Believe It Or Not” told its readers 
                                                 
28.  I rely on my personal knowledge of Mandan-Hidatsa 
creation myths and my youthful cinematic experience watching a wide variety 
of vintage American westerns as the composite source for telling my 
American creation stories. 
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that the same day the thunderbirds arrived on the Great Northern 
Railroad, the rains returned to western North Dakota. 
 The lesson learned from my story is not that the traditional 
Indian world is suffused by ritual and magical belief, though it well 
maybe. Nor is the lesson taught that non-Indians, too, yearn for an 
encompassing meaning that renders nature’s arbitrary treatment of 
them understandable, though they probably do. No, my story shows 
that the Hidatsa peoples, like other Indian peoples, belong to 
America in a manner fundamentally different from those European 
and other immigrants who came later to settle, what was to them, a 
new land. 
C. How the Indian People’s Original Compact with America 
Served Their Historic Needs and Aspirations 
 
 The pragmatic legal and political difference in how the 
Indian peoples belong to America is the practical result of Chief 
Justice John Marshall’s three famous Indian law opinions dating 
from 1823 to 1832. His trilogy of foundational Indian law opinions29 
introduced the “aboriginality doctrine” into the American common 
law. In this doctrine, Marshall established the Indian people’s 
distinctive mode of belonging to America in three legal principles. 
First, he recognized the Indian people’s inherent ownership of their 
aboriginally occupied lands.30 Second, he confirmed the Indian 
people’s retained right of self-governance over their lands as 
“domestic, dependent nations.”31 Third, he pledged the federal 
government’s honor to protect the Indian people’s inherent and 
retained rights from outside interference.32 Marshall’s three Indian 
law opinions—implemented by later federal treaties, statutes and 
executive orders—set the terms for the original political and legal 
compact between the Indian and non-Indian peoples.33 
                                                 
29.  See supra note 8. 
30.  See Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823). 
31.  See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831). 
32.  See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832). 
33.  Marshall created this dialogic basis by 
“contradistinguish[ing] [the Indian peoples] by a [political] name appropriate 
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 While this original compact may have served the historic 
needs and aspirations of the Indian peoples, I contend that it must 
be re-negotiated today, in agential terms, so as to foster the growth 
of a second American civil society, one founded on authentic 
principles of deep diversity. The new compact will serve as the 
starting point for new dialogues that focuses on three agential 
factors of development that I believe can lead, ultimately, to a new 
American civic order. These three agential factors are: educational 
agency, political agency and legal agency. If they are given their due 
regard and weight within the new legal and political dialogue 
between these two peoples, then a re-founded American civic order 
will hopefully emerge, one founded on Geertz’s “deep diversity” 
principles. 
D. The Nature and Scope of the Indian People’s Compact with 
America 
 
 Due to their unique compact with America, sociologists and 
political theorists attribute a “thick” social and political identity to 
the Indian peoples. Indian identity can therefore only be 
adequately comprehended by the deep description of a given 
Indian person’s specific tribal life ways that link him to America via 
his belonging to a particular tribe, clan, and aboriginal territory.34 
America’s non-Indian peoples, by contrast, possess a “thin” 
                                                                                                             
to themselves” and that name is “tribe.” 30 U.S. at 18. Professor Stephen 
Cornell suggests that by “tribalizing” the Indian peoples, Marshall may have 
been promoting their political maturation: “[T]ribalization could have 
advantages for Indians. They, too, had political agendas; they also were in 
pursuit of peace, secure borders, access to resources only available from their 
adversaries. Centralized political structures, often including new leadership 
positions, had advantages in dealing with European and American 
governments and their representatives. As such, dealing came to play a larger 
role in Indian life; specialized political organization became increasingly 
advantageous. It offered opportunities to ambitious individuals or factions 
seeking to extend their influence or power.” Stephen Cornell, The Return of 
the Native: American Indian Political Resurgence 79 (1988). 
34.  Michael Walzer, Thick And Thin: Moral Arguments at 
Home and Abroad (1994). 
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political and legal identity arising out of their very different legal 
and historical relationship to America.35 
E. The Nature and Scope of the Non-Indian People’s Compact 
with America 
 
 Two very different views of how the non-Indian peoples 
came to belong to America may help illustrate the vast differences 
between them and the Indian peoples of America. First, a scholarly 
view of how non-Indians came to belong to America. Sociologist 
Brackette F. Williams contrasts America’s Indian peoples with 
what she calls America’s “voluntary minorities.”36 She is referring 
to all those many Northern and Southern European ethnic groups 
who immigrated to America from the mid-nineteenth to early 
twentieth centuries. These ethnic groups voluntarily shed their 
“Old World” identities and adapted to the prevailing American 
norms and values as the price of their admission to the New World. 
Through a generations long adaptive process that Williams calls 
“ethnic succession,” these former European ethnics moved from 
America’s service class, to the crafts and trades and ultimately, to 
the “top rung” American professions as lawyers, doctors, academics 
and political leaders.37  
 In becoming what Professor Williams calls “honorary white 
Americans,” these erstwhile European ethnics relinquished their 
“thick” Old World identities that had tied them to their local 
village-based customs and dialects, their traditional colorful 
costumes of dress, as well their local myths, superstitions and oral 
histories. In exchange, they received the “thin” identity of 
American citizenship that, of practical necessity, suppressed these 
ethnic groups’ idiosyncratic and multifarious Old World identities 
                                                 
35.  Id. 
36.  Brackette F. Williams, A Class Act: Anthropology and the 
Race to Nation Across Ethnic Terrain, 18 ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 401-44 
(1989). 
37.  Id. 
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in service of a common, but severely limited, set of American civic 
freedoms and rights.38 
 Second, a contemporary filmmaker’s view of how non-
Indians came to belong to America. Martin Scorcese’s visually 
sumptuous, but extraordinarily violent, film, The Gangs of New 
York, essays the same ethnic terrain as did Williams.39 He tells the 
story of the warring, rival immigrant groups who contested for 
control of the back alleys and water fronts of mid-nineteenth 
century New York City. These rival ethnic groups, or “tribes” as 
the film’s narrator calls them, bear distinctive names such as the 
Dead Rabbits, the Plug Uglies and the Native Americans, each 
name evocative of some ethnic characteristic that set one ethnic 
gang apart from another. The film’s hero, played by Leonardo Di 
Caprio, witnesses, as a young child, his father’s vicious murder at 
the hands of a rival gang lord, played by Daniel Day-Lewis. Di 
Caprio’s father, a priest of sorts, was the leader of the Dead 
Rabbits, an Irish tribe that recently immigrated to America from 
County Kerry, Ireland.40 
 Di Caprio’s character swears an “old world blood oath” of 
revenge against his father’s murderer. He plots throughout the 
movie to fulfill his oath at the opportune time. Bloody 
confrontation after confrontation chronicles these rival immigrant 
tribes struggles for primacy within Scorcese’s version of “ethnic 
succession” in New York City. These groups battled first for control 
of New York’s streets and later for political control of New York’s 
electoral machinery. Scorcese’s film ends with these rival ethnic 
gangs swallowed up in an even larger conflagration-the American 
                                                 
38.  Id. 
39.  Gangs of New York (Miramax Studios 2002) (motion 
picture). Movie critic, Jeff Shannon, writes director Scorcese’s film tells a “tale 
of primal vengeance between Irish American son Amsterdam Vallon 
(Leonardo Di Caprio) and his father’s ruthless killer and ‘Nativist’ gang leader 
Bill ‘the Butcher’ Cutting (Daniel Day-Lewis, brutally inspired), so named for 
his lethal talent with knives.” Scorcese’s film “erases the decorum of text 
books” to tell “American history written in blood, unflinching, authentic, and 
utterly spectacular.” Editorial Reviews, Amazon.com. 
40.  Id. 
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Civil War. Because these ethnic groups’ alternative and 
idiosyncratic values and loyalties ultimately conflicted with the new 
American nation’s ability to coercively draft sufficient immigrant 
manpower to prosecute its war against the break-away Confederate 
states, Scorcese graphically depicts their gruesome destruction by 
American military might.41 
 In the film’s climactic scene the American naval 
bombardment of the gangs’ Five Points stronghold liquidates most 
of their members. Daniel Day-Lewis’ character, now dead and 
buried in Potter’s Field on the Brooklyn side of the East River, 
bears silent witness to the rise of world’s greatest city, modern New 
York City. We, too, as filmgoers, see in the blink of an eye, through 
the magic of time-lapse photography, the rise of Manhattan’s 
distinctive skyline of towering, perpendicular, literally gleaming 
shafts of steel and glass.42 
 Scorcese’s film and Williams’ essay tell the same story: the 
necessary breaking of Old World ethnic loyalties and idiosyncratic 
value systems so as to release their immigrant captives into a 
common American civic identity. Simplification of the American 
political order, by constitutional interpretation where possible and 
by coercion when necessary, came at the expense, as Scorcese and 
Williams maintain, of rival ethnic groups’ identities and values. 
Well known examples of this “Americanization” process range 
from the state’s outlawing of the Mormon practice of polygamy, the 
state’s confrontation with the Amish over that religious sect’s 
refusal to send their children to high school, to America’s ghastly 
decision to imprison Japanese-Americans during WWII out of its 
ostensible fear of that ethnic group’s divided loyalties and their 
possible propensity for sabotage of American war interests.43 
 
                                                 
41.  Id. 
42.  An anonymous reviewer (“Marc My Words”) writes that 
Scorcese’s film tells the story of “America as the great melting pot or a 
country fought and died for by those feeling worthy of the term natives.” Id. 
43.  See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878); Wisconsin 
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 
(1944). 
  
 
190       PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW     Vol. 36 
 
 
F. How the Contemporary Supreme Court Has Seemingly 
 “Misread” The Indian Peoples’ Original Compact with 
America 
 
 Given the American state’s drive over the past two hundred 
years to craft a common American civic identity, seemingly at the 
expense of its ethnic and cultural minorities, it may come as a 
surprise that the contemporary Supreme Court’s Indian law 
opinions have seemingly re-affirmed the Indian peoples’ original 
compact with America. Indian law scholars have appropriately 
applauded these opinions as “keeping faith” with Marshall’s 
“aboriginality doctrine.”44 Unfortunately, this seeming judicial 
affirmation of Marshall’s tribal sovereignty and autonomy 
principles comes with what, I believe, is an unacceptably high price 
tag: the deepened exclusion of the Indian peoples from any 
meaningful legal or political role within contemporary American 
civic life. 
 The Supreme Court’s recent Indian jurisdictional decisions 
have explicated this deepened exclusion of the Indian peoples from 
American civic life in terms of the Indian peoples’ presumptive lack 
of inherent criminal jurisdiction,45 inherent regulatory jurisdiction,46 
and adjudicatory jurisdiction47 over non-Indians who commit crimes 
or civil wrongs within Indian Country. Libertarian legal scholars, 
such as Paul S. Berman, seemingly approve of these Indian 
jurisdictional decisions that reduce Indian tribes to “non-territorial 
entities” that may legitimately exercise jurisdiction only over those 
individuals who expressly subject themselves to Indian 
jurisdiction.48 
 The Supreme Court has candidly acknowledged that its 
opinions will likely make it more difficult for the Indian peoples to 
maintain basic civil or criminal order within Indian Country. 
                                                 
44.  Charles Wilkinson, American Indians, Time and the Law 
(1988). 
45.  Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978). 
46.  Montana v. U.S., 450 U.S. 544 (1981). 
47.  Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 117 S. Ct. 1404 (1997). 
48.  See Berman, supra note 15, at 461. 
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However, the Court has left open the possibility of future 
congressional remedial action49 or of tribal civil regulatory 
jurisdiction over a particular non-Indian defendant, if his actions 
pose a demonstrable “direct and substantial” threat to a protected 
tribal interest.50 Although the Court did not repudiate the Indian 
peoples’ original compact with America, it substantially re-wrote 
it.51 Justice Rehnquist’s Oliphant52 opinion extended Chief Justice 
Marshall’s extremely circumspect and externally focused “implicit 
divestiture” doctrine deep into the geographic confines of Indian 
Country.53 As a result, today’s Indian peoples have been judicially 
deprived of their inherent sovereign jurisdiction over non-members, 
even within the geographic confines of their own federally 
recognized tribal homelands, popularly known as Indian Country.54 
                                                 
49.  While Rehnquist recognizes that the “prevalence of non-
Indian crime on today’s reservations” may “forcefully argue... [in favor of 
Indian people’s] ability to try non-Indians...” he concludes that “these are 
considerations for Congress to weigh in deciding whether Indian tribes should 
finally be authorized to try non-Indians.” See 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978). 
50.  Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima 
Indian Reservation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989). 
51.  Professor Joe Singer criticized the Brendale decision re-
characterizing the Indian peoples as a legally disfavored racial caste: “The 
Supreme Court has assumed in recent years that although non-Indians have 
the right to be free from the political control by Indian nations, American 
Indians can and should be subject to the political sovereignty of non-Indians. 
This disparate treatment of both property and political rights is not the result 
of neutral rules being applied in a manner that has disparate impact. Rather, it 
is the result of formally unequal rules. Moreover, it can be explained only by 
reference to perhaps unconscious racist assumptions about the distribution of 
both nature and power. This fact implies an uncomfortable truth: both 
property rights and political power are associated with a system of racial 
caste.” Joseph Singer, Sovereignty and Property, 86 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1, 4-5 
(1991). 
52.  See 435 U.S. 191 (1978). 
53.  See Richard B. Collins, Implied Limitations on the 
Jurisdiction of Indian Tribes, 54 WASH. L. REV. 479 (1979). 
54.  Id. 
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G.  Why Did The “Sick Chicken” Cross the Jurisdictional 
Road into Indian Country? Because Tribal Governments 
Are Not Constitutionally Obligated to Accord Due Process 
to Non-Member Defendants 
 
 The Supreme Court arguably foreswore, in the aftermath of 
its notorious 1935 Schecter55 decision—more popularly known as 
the “sick chicken” decision—any overt usurpation of Congress’ 
legislative functions under the interpretive guise of its ill-fated 
“substantive due process” doctrine.56 While it may have foresworn 
its role as “judicial legislator” in other areas of the law, its role, in 
that regard, seems to be alive and well in the Indian law arena. 
Some Indian law scholars attribute the Court’s revived “legislative” 
role in federal Indian law to its 1978 decision in Santa Clara Pueblo 
v. Martinez.57 
 There, an Indian tribe, Santa Clara Pueblo, imposed a 
membership rule that admittedly discriminated against the 
offspring of female members of the tribe, while it materially 
advantaged the offspring of male members of that tribe. The Santa 
Clara Pueblo, a federally recognized Indian tribe, denied tribal 
membership to the children of a female tribal member who had 
married outside the tribe. But that same tribal government enrolled 
the children of any male tribal member who had similarly married 
outside the tribe.58 
 The lower federal courts had no difficulty in holding this 
tribal membership rule invalid as invidiously discriminatory 
governmental action that singled out and unfairly burdened female 
tribal members. Because the tribal government failed to 
demonstrate a “compelling governmental interest” justifying such 
discrimination, the lower courts held the tribal enrollment 
                                                 
55.  Schecter Poultry Corp. v. U.S., 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
56.  See Dawn E. Johnson, Ronald Reagan and the Rehnquist 
Court: Presidential Influences on Congressional Change, 78 IND. L. J. 363, 368-
371 (2003). 
57.  436 U.S. 49 (1978). 
58.  Id. at 60. 
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ordinance violated the equal protection and due process guarantees 
of governing federal law.59 
 But the Supreme Court resoundingly reversed the lower 
federal courts’ holdings in this regard–why? Although its opinion 
was couched in procedural and jurisdictional terms, the underlying 
logic of the Court’s opinion harkened back to its earlier, 
unapologetically substantive judicial decisions such as Talton v. 
Mayes60 and Ex Parte Crow Dog.61 
 Extending America’s equal protection and due process 
norms into Indian Country threatened, in the Supreme Court’s 
estimation, the nation’s longstanding compact with the Indian 
peoples. That compact, among other things, guaranteed the right of 
Indian self-governance over peculiarly Indian matters, such as the 
issue of who is eligible for tribal membership.62 Because the lower 
federal courts had failed to evince “proper judicial respect” for 
tribal sovereignty, the Supreme Court reversed their holdings 
regarding the enrollment status of Mrs. Martinez’s children.63 
 In language evocative of language from its much earlier 
opinion in an Indian criminal jurisdiction case, Ex Parte Crow 
Dog,64 the Court upheld the Santa Clara Pueblo’s exclusive 
authority to determine issues of tribal membership. In Crow Dog, 
the Court struck down the federal government’s effort to extend 
federal criminal jurisdiction over Indians who wrongfully killed 
their fellow tribal members. In rejecting federal criminal 
jurisdiction over Indian criminal conduct the Court said:  
 
[Such federal action] seeks to impose on the 
[Indians] the restraint of an external and unknown 
code . . . which judges them by standards made by 
others and not for them . . . It tries them, not by 
their peers, nor by the customs of their peoples, nor 
                                                 
59.  Id. 
60.  163 U.S. 376 (1896). 
61.  109 U.S. 556 (1883). 
62.  See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text. 
63.  Id. 
64.  109 U.S. 556 (1883). 
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the law of their land, but by superiors of a different 
race according to the law of a social state of which 
they have an imperfect conception, and which is 
opposed to the traditions of their history, to the 
habits of their lives, to the strongest prejudices of 
their savage nature; one which measures the red 
man’s revenge by the maxims of white man’s 
morality.65  
 
 Indian law scholars resoundingly praised the Martinez 
decision as “keeping faith” with the historic Indian compact with 
America. Only a few Indian law scholars recognized the potential 
downside of a judicial decision that seemingly relieved the Indian 
peoples of the very costly, and arguably normatively intrusive, 
necessity of according equal protection or procedural due process 
rights to all defendants who were potentially subject to tribal 
governmental jurisdiction. Even fewer Indian law scholars intuited 
the Schecter  type confrontation that would arise if Congress sought 
to authorize the Indian peoples to exercise criminal or civil 
jurisdiction over non-tribal members in an instance wherein the 
Supreme Court, via its application of its modern judicial divestment 
doctrine, had held the Indian peoples had “lost” that particular 
sovereign prerogative of jurisdictional authority.66 
H. Can The Indian Peoples Realize Meaningful Self 
Determination Via The Judicial And Legislative Fulfillment 
Of Their Original Compact? 
 
 The Indian peoples have taken important, but limited, 
strides towards self-determination within the confines of their 
original compact with America. Given that Congress has endorsed, 
beginning in 1975, the concept of Indian self-determination as the 
guiding principle of its contemporary Indian law and policy, there 
has been some progress made toward the social and economic 
                                                 
65.  Id. at 571. 
66.  U.S. v. Lara, 2004 U.S. Lexis 2738 (April 10, 2004). 
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development of Indian Country.67 The Indian Self Determination 
Act of 197568 authorizes qualified Indian tribes to contractually 
“takeover” Indian benefit programs presently administered by the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”) or the Indian Health Service 
(”IHS”). Under the contractual authority granted by this act, many 
Indian tribes have assumed administrative control of many BIA 
and IHS programs within their respective reservations.69 
 Other congressional efforts to promote Indian self-
determination have generated significant conflict with non-Indians’ 
ostensible equal protection and due process rights. This nation’s 
first “reverse discrimination” lawsuit arose from a non-Indian’s 
equal protection challenge to an Indian employment provision of 
the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act (“IRA”).70 The BIA in the 
early 1970s acted to enforce that hitherto dormant provision that 
called for the preferential employment of qualified Indians within 
the BIA. The BIA interpreted the purpose of this Indian 
employment preference statute to be the eventual “Indianization” 
of that agency, where practicable. 
 The Supreme Court in 1974 heard a non-Indian employee’s 
equal protection challenge to this Indian preference statute in 
Morton v. Mancari.71 The Court agreed with the non-Indian 
plaintiffs characterization of the statute’s effect as imposing a 
significant “employment disadvantage” on non-Indian employees 
of the BIA. The Court also agreed that if this Indian employment 
preference was fulsomely implemented, then existing non-Indians 
employees would be “gradual[ly] replace[d] by Indians within the 
BIA.72 But the Court nonetheless held that the non-Indian plaintiff 
could not be heard to complain because this Indian preference 
statute did not constitute “racial discrimination” at all, it was, 
                                                 
67.  See generally Tadd M. Johnson and James Hamilton, Self-
Governance For the Indian Tribes: From Paternalism To Empowerment, 27 
CONN. L. REV. 1251 (1995) [hereinafter Johnson]. 
68.  25 U.S.C. § 450(a)-(n) (2000). 
69.  Johnson, supra note 67, at 1267-68. 
70.  Pub. L. 73-383, 48 Stat. 984 (1934). 
71.  417 U.S. 535 (1974). 
72.  Id. at 544. 
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instead, a permissible means by which Congress sought to fulfill a 
trust duty it owed to members of quasi-sovereign Indian nations.73 
I. Summary: Indian Self-Determination and the Deepened 
Exclusion of the Indian Peoples from Participation in 
American Civic Life 
 
 By seeming consensus, almost everyone agrees that the 
Indian peoples have made remarkable progress toward self-
determination over the past thirty years since Congress’ adoption of 
the Indian Self-Determination Act.74 But the Supreme Court’s 
recent Indian law decisions—perhaps because of the Indian 
peoples’ acknowledged economic and social development-
nonetheless confirm that the Indian peoples remains excluded, as 
qua Indians, from any future role in American civic life. The Indian 
peoples’ entry into American civic life, therefore, has to be 
premised on a fundamentally different legal and political approach. 
In the next section of my essay, I sketch the legal and political 
rationale for Indian civic participation based on what I call the 
“second American founding” based on principles of deep diversity. 
II. THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL PRESUMPTIONS 
UNDERLYING THE SECOND AMERICAN FOUNDING 
BASED ON PRINCIPLES OF DEEP DIVERSITY 
A. Why the First American Founding Failed the Indian 
Peoples and Other Ethnic Minorities of America 
 
 Many constitutional scholars have criticized the “first 
American founding” as based on principles of political and legal 
exclusion, rather than on a broad-gauged, inclusive vision of a 
liberal polity that welcomed future citizens of all races, gender and 
religious or cultural affiliations.75  The Indian peoples were, of 
                                                 
73.  Id. at 553. 
74.  25 U.S.C. § 450 (a)-(n) (2000). 
75.  Professor Nathan Glazer, for example, argues that the 
Winning of the West, written on the epic scale by Teddy Roosevelt, created 
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course, explicitly excluded by constitutional language from any 
future civic participation in the American republic, while other 
groups—particularly African-Americans and women—were 
implicitly excluded from any meaningful civic participation in the 
republic’s future civic life.76 
 The overtly compromised character of the “first American 
founding” is best evidenced by the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
continued exclusion of the Indian peoples. That amendment’s 
explicit purpose—as the proudest constitutional product of the 
vaunted American Reconstruction Era—was to extend the right of 
civic participation to America’s hitherto excluded “involuntary 
minorities” in a politically and morally “re-founded” American 
Republic.77 The lower federal courts interpreted the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s blanket grant of citizenship to “[a]ll persons born or 
naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof’ as intentionally excluding the Indian peoples.78 
                                                                                                             
the national text of “unabashed nationalism” for the displacement and 
dispossession of the Indian peoples. The Indians in Roosevelt’s text are 
unredeemably cruel and treacherous. He characterizes the Indians thus” Not 
only were they terrible in battle, but they were cruel beyond all belief in 
victory…The hideous, unnamable, unthinkable tortures [practiced] by the red 
men on their captured [foes’] tender women and helpless children were such 
as read of in no other struggle, hardly even the revolting pages that tell the 
deeds of the Holy Inquisition.” Nathan Glazer, American Epic: Then and 
Now, Pub. Int. 12 (Winter 1998). Given the unredeemable Indian character, 
Roosevelt feels no need for a retrospective national apology for the Indians’ 
destruction by federal military forces: “Looking back, it is easy to say that 
much of the wrong-doing could have been prevented; but if we examine the 
facts to find out the truth, not to establish a theory, we are bound to admit that 
the struggle could not possibly have been avoided.....Unless we were willing 
that the whole continent west of the Alleghenies should remain an unpeopled 
waste, the hunting ground of savages, war was inevitable.” Id. at 12-13. 
76.  David C. Williams, The Borders of the Equal Protection 
Clause: Indians As Peoples, 38 UCLA L. Rev. 759 (1991). 
77.  McKay v. Campbell, 16 Fed. Cases 161, 165 (D. Or. 1871) 
(No. 840). 
78.  Id. 
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 The Supreme Court later adopted that reasoning, in its 1884 
decision in Elk v. Wilkins,79 holding that an individual Indian could 
not free himself from his Indian status by self-help through his 
voluntary adoption of non-Indian ways of living which included 
paying taxes, sending his children to public school and regularly 
attending Christian church services.80 Indeed, some quasi-
conservative constitutional legal scholars—such as Professor 
Kenneth Karst—have criticized Congress’s later enactment of the 
American Indian Naturalization Act of 1924,81 as both potentially 
illegal, given the exclusionary language of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and the Elk decision, and wrong-headed because 
Indians should remain excluded from the national civic culture.82  
 My sketch of the political and legal rationale underlying a 
real, not merely rhetorical, second American founding presumes 
the founding of a “new Indian citizenship.” This new citizenship, 
deriving from principles of deep diversity, will become the primary 
                                                 
79.  112 U.S. 94, 109 (1884) (holding that Indians are “not subject 
to the jurisdiction” of the United States, or citizens of the United States, or of 
the states within which they reside). 
80.  Id. 
81.  8 U.S.C. §1401(a)(2) (2000). 
82.  Indians should remain excluded from American civil society 
because their political participation, qua Indians, therein would fundamentally 
skew the ruling American concepts of equal protection and due process. Karst 
makes this clear in his following statement: “[T]he separation of the Indian 
nations from the rest of American society now rests on more than white 
domination and is actively cultivated by a number of Indian leaders who see 
separation as the markedly from those faced by only way to preserve their 
cultures. Among Indians, cultural politics has always faced issues that differ 
among immigrant groups. None of our immigrants, from the Irish to the 
Vietnamese, have faced anything closely nations, or the pan-Indian 
comparable to the questions raised by the role of the reservation, the reach of 
sovereignty of Indian movement. Those issues confront Indians, as individuals 
and nations, with some hard choices as they seek to preserve their separate 
cultures and still participate in the American economy and society. Whatever 
political forms may emerge from the current ferment, the larger society has an 
obligation--the obligations of citizens to each other-to see that Indian peoples 
have the resources they need if these choices are to be real.” See David 
Williams, supra note 76, at 772. 
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means by which Indians, qua Indians, can achieve full participation 
in the civic life of the re-founded American Republic. It further 
presumes that if the Indian peoples succeed in their endeavor of 
establishing a new Indian citizenship, then its underlying civic 
principles can be extended to other existing and emerging ethnic 
and cultural minorities within America.83 
 Hopefully, the non-Indians’ residual “fear and prudence,” 
that caused them to originally exclude the Indian peoples from 
American social and political life, will have to be allayed via 
thorough educational and dialogic means of encounter between 
these two peoples. Fortunately, there are political and legal means 
at hand to develop this new dialogic relationship. I first sketch this 
process of legal and political dialogue that will lay the groundwork 
for this second American founding. I then sketch, in bare outline, 
what this new civic relationship, founded on principles of deep 
diversity, may look like. 
B. Constructing an Appropriate Mythology for the Second 
 American Founding 
 
 The chronicle of the first American founding was written in 
the shed blood of patriots and the cant of American Manifest 
Destiny. The chronicle of the second American founding will be 
written in the more modest, but equally hard muscled, grammar of 
human generosity, tolerance and diversity.84 The principles of the 
first American founding were constitutionally broadcast in 
universal terms that ostensibly commanded justice and equality for 
all, but, in practice, were available only to the select few deemed fit 
to govern in the first American republic. The principles of the 
second American founding will, in theory and practice, welcome 
                                                 
83.  Professor Adeno Addis has coined the phrase “pluralistic 
solidarity” that will facilitate the development of “institutional structures and 
processes that would simultaneously allow us to affirm and respect plurality 
while also cultivation some notion of [national] solidarity.” Adeno Addis, On 
Human Diversity and the Limits of Toleration, in Ethnicity And Group Rights 
112 (Ian Shapiro and Will Kymlicka eds., N.Y. U. Press 1997). 
84.  Id. 
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and respect the differing ethnic, cultural and religious minorities 
who choose to enrich and build this new American society. The 
accompanying mythology of this new American republic 
appropriately begins by welcoming the Indian peoples into the civic 
life of the old American Republic. 
 The transition to this new America is made legally and 
politically possible by incorporating the political theory of 
economist and social theorist, A.K. Sen.85 Sen argues for affirmative 
governmental action that builds the agential capacities of hitherto 
politically and socially excluded groups—women, as well as 
unwelcome ethnic and cultural minorities—as the means for 
creating greater social wealth and the promoting of shared 
democratic values and interests.86 Sen would likely agree that the 
Indian peoples, as well as other American ethnic and cultural 
minorities, would embrace this new American citizenship because it 
does not demand, as did the old version of American citizenship, 
that they sacrifice their Indian identities and cultural values as the 
price for their admission into American civic life.87 
 In the next two sections of my essay I contrast the “wrong” 
way and the “right” way of achieving this transition to a new 
citizenship status for America’s hitherto excluded ethnic and 
cultural minorities—particularly the American Indian peoples. The 
wrong transitional strategy derives from non-Indians’ historic “fear 
and prudence” that lead them to regard the Indian peoples, as well 
as other contemporary American ethnic and cultural minorities, as 
the potentially dangerous, “excluded other.” This wrong strategy 
presumes that their inclusion will threaten the delicately woven 
political and social fabric of the American civic order. I examine the 
failure of this first strategy that sought to “shoehorn” the Indian 
peoples as a newly racialized minority group, into a new American 
citizenship status. By this thinking, Indians would benefit legally 
and politically because as a racial, rather than a political, minority 
                                                 
85.  Amartya Komar Sen, Development as Freedom 145-59 (1st 
ed., Oxford U. Press 1999). 
86.  Id. 
87.  Id. 
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they would be entitled to the affirmative protections afforded by 
the equal protection and due process clauses of the Constitution.88 
C. Why the Attempted “Shoehorning” of the Indian Peoples, 
as a Newly Racialized Minority, into Contemporary 
American Civic Life, Failed 
1.  Why Indian Peoples Were Re-Classified as a Racial 
Minority During the American Civil Rights and Great 
Society Eras of the 1960s and 1970s 
 
 Re-classifying the Indian peoples as a racial minority during 
the American civil rights era of the mid to late 1960s seemed to 
afford a quick and economical means to end the Indian peoples’ 
longstanding exclusion from American civic life.89 Indeed, this re-
conception of Indians as a racial minority made practical and legal 
sense. The red-hot rhetoric of the civil rights activists, during the 
1960s and 1970s, exposed the Indian peoples to the reality of their 
exclusion from the economic and political realms of American 
power and success. Many Indian peoples participated in the famed 
1968 “Poor People’s March on Washington,” thus demonstrating 
their solidarity with other destitute and politically powerless 
American ethnic and cultural minorities. Many Indian young 
peoples, myself included, benefited personally from those 
government initiatives directed at overcoming economic and social 
disadvantages imposed on the Indian peoples by entrenched, 
ostensibly race-based state and private discrimination, coupled with 
                                                 
88.  Professor Mark Tushnet, while not explicitly mentioning 
American Indians, obviously speaks to their politically and economically 
excluded status as ethnic minorities when he speaks of the “constitutional 
vision of the New Deal-Great Society regime” in these terms: “Racial 
segregation had to be overcome by aggressive policies of national support for 
the aspirations of African-Americans; economic inequality had to be 
addressed through a War on Poverty; the travails of old age had to be reduced 
by providing health care to the elderly through the Medicare program.” Mark 
Tushnet, The New Constitutional Order 30 (Princeton U. Press 2003). 
89.  Id. 
  
 
202       PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW     Vol. 36 
 
 
institutional barriers that had historically hindered their entry into 
the professional and political life of America.90 
 Indians were perceived by civil rights activists as having 
been originally imprisoned on their respective Indian reservations 
by wrong-headed, if not discriminatory, federal action in the late 
nineteenth century. Given their heightened poverty rate and their 
lack of educational achievement, the Indian peoples were viewed as 
especially worthy recipients of federal civil rights and social welfare 
attention. 
 Because I grew up on the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation, 
North Dakota, during the “hay day” of President Kennedy’s civil 
rights revolution and President Johnson’s Great Society programs, I 
witnessed the federal expenditure of millions of dollars, on my 
home reservation alone, to fund new Indian housing developments, 
create new reservation-based jobs and fund new Indian education 
initiatives. Some Indian leaders, such as my father, a tribal council 
member at that time, deemed these federal anti-poverty 
expenditures as the long delayed fulfillment of the government’s 
Indian treaty and trust duty obligations. Meanwhile, leaders of 
other ethnic minority groups, particularly those African-Americans 
residing in America’s economically by-passed inner cities, viewed 
these new civil rights initiatives and social welfare reforms, as the 
long delayed federal action necessary to redeem America from its 
ignoble history of slavery.91 
2. Why This Wrong Strategy Failed to Achieve its Legal and 
Political Goals 
 
 There are many competing theories as to why the American 
civil rights revolution and the Great Society programs of the 1960s 
and 1970s failed to realize their legal and political goal of 
integrating America’s hitherto excluded ethnic and racial minorities 
into the professional and economic life of America.92 Somewhat 
                                                 
90.  David Getches, et. al., Federal Indian Law 226 (4th ed.). 
91.  Tauyna Lovell Banks, Exploring White Resistance To Racial 
Reconciliation in the United States, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 903 (Summer, 2003). 
92.  Richard J. Herrnstein & Charles Murray, The Bell Curve: 
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reluctantly, I add my own assessment to the already lengthy list of 
commentators on this issue. In my opinion, these initiatives failed 
because they sought to integrate the Indian peoples, as well as other 
ethnic and cultural minorities, as “honorary whites” into American 
economic and social life. As Professor Williams demonstrated early, 
these contemporary civil rights and social welfare programs were 
built on the deeply flawed “ethnic succession” model which 
required the targeted ethnic minorities to shed their deeply held, 
perhaps seemingly idiosyncratic, beliefs and values as the price of 
their admission into American citizenship.93 Understandably, many, 
if not most, of the Indian peoples rejected civil and political 
“integration” into American civic life as unduly destructive of their 
unique life-ways.94 
 It’s not surprising, therefore, that by the early 1980s, the 
grand era of civil rights and Great Society reforms came to a 
screeching halt. While some political pundits attribute this outcome 
to a sea change in the American peoples’ attitude towards “big 
government” and “big social welfare programs,” I believe these 
initiatives failed primarily because the Indian peoples, and other 
ethnic and cultural minorities, did not want to be “integrated” into 
American civic life in the manner demanded by these initiatives. 
It’s true that many critics focused on the alleged failure of these 
federal initiatives to quickly produce the economic and social 
assimilation of America’s ethnic minority groups into mainstream 
American life. Other critics branded the Civil Rights and Great 
Society initiatives of the 1960s as overly grandiose and practicably 
unrealizable “social engineering” prescriptions. Some of those same 
critics claimed that their failure proved the bogus character of the 
theory and practice of racial integration as the route to a morally 
refounded American republic.95 Predictably perhaps, the competing 
Presidential hopefuls during the 1980 election—both Democratic 
and Republican—competed to “re-invent” a leaner and meaner 
federal government that would “get off the peoples’ backs” by 
                                                                                                             
Intelligence and Class Structure In American Life (Free Press 1994). 
93.  See B. Williams, supra note 39, at 401-44. 
94.  Id. 
95.  See Herrnstein, supra note 93. 
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radically shrinking the federal government’s social welfare and 
regulatory roles in Americans’ lives.96 
3. How the Failure of the Integrationist Ideal Introduced 
Agential Theory into American Life 
 
 I have chosen two climactic federal actions to symbolize the 
closing of the “integrationist” era of American civil rights law, and 
the arrival of the “agential” era of federal Indian law. The first 
climactic action is represented by President William Jefferson 
Clinton’s political “change of heart” that led him to champion the 
enactment of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act of 1996.97 Some of his staunchest political allies 
opposed this act as a breach of a long standing federal promise to 
protect the America’s dependent and vulnerable children.98 But 
Clinton argued that in order to save the federal welfare program at 
all, it had to be fundamentally recast in, what I call, agentialist 
terms. America’s welfare “moms and dads” are effectively 
appointed by this act as their dependent children’s agents. They are 
given a stringently limited period of welfare eligibility in which to 
become dependable economic providers for their dependent 
children.99 
 The second climactic action is symbolized by Justice Ruth 
Bader Ginsberg’s recent opinion in United States v. Navajo 
Nation.100 Her Navajo Nation opinion requires Indian peoples to 
become independent and active agents in their assertion and 
protection of their distinctive legal rights. In Navajo Nation, the 
United States challenged the lower federal court’s decision that 
declared it in breach of its Indian trust duties, thereby rendering it 
                                                 
96.  William R. O’Neill, Commonweal of Woe? The Ethics of 
Welfare Reform, 11 NOTRE DAME J.L, ETHICS & PUB. POLICY 487 (1997). 
97.  This act imposes work requirements and lifetime caps, limits 
aid to young mothers, limits aid to immigrants, and provides for child support 
enforcement. Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996). 
98.  See Larry Cata Baca, Poor Relief Welfare Paralysis and 
Assimilation, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1996). 
99.  Id. 
100.  537 U.S. 488 (2003). 
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potentially liable for over $600 million in damages to the Navajo 
Nation.101 The facts of this case focused on the Interior Secretary’s 
admittedly unsavory conduct in connection with his execution of a 
Navajo coal lease with Peabody Coal Company in the early 
1980s.102 The Court had to decide whether his shabby treatment of 
his Navajo wards’ legal and economic interests breached the trust 
duties that he owed to those Indian peoples. Undisputed facts 
showed that Interior Secretary Donald P. Hodel secretly set aside, 
at Peabody Coal’s behest, a BIA recommended twenty-percent 
lease royalty rate based on the prevailing fair market value of the 
affected Navajo coal resource.103 
 Instead of exercising his secretarial power to include that 
recommended rate as part of the proposed lease agreement, 
Secretary Hodel told the Navajos to go back to the bargaining table 
and make the best deal they could with Peabody Coal104 Chastened 
by Hodel’s advice, the Navajos returned to the bargaining table and 
eventually negotiated a 12.5-percent per ton royalty rate with 
Peabody Coal.105 The Navajos’ complaint claimed they thereby lost 
over $600 million in foregone royalty payments over the life of the 
coal lease. 
 But the Supreme Court, per Justice Ginsberg’s opinion, 
reversed the lower court’s breach of trust holding. It did so because 
the Navajo Indians, and presumably the other Indian peoples, as 
well, must now act, given her reading of the Indian Mineral Leasing 
Act’s (“IMLA’s”) self-determination language and intent, as legally 
and economically capable agents who bear the primary 
responsibility for negotiating beneficial mineral lease agreements 
with outside third party interests.106 Justice Ginsberg quoted the 
IMLA’s statutory preamble describing its overriding purpose as the 
“enhancement of tribal self-determination.’’107 Given this plain 
                                                 
101.  Id. at 495-96. 
102.  Id. at 498. 
103.  Id. 
104.  Id. at 497. 
105.  Id. 
106.  Id. at 513. 
107.  Id.  
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statutory intent, she concluded that it was the Navajo tribe’s 
responsibility, not Secretary Hodel’s responsibility, to negotiate a 
fair deal with Peabody Coal Company. She concludes:  
 
In sum neither the IMLA, nor any of its regulations, 
established anything more than a bare minimum 
royalty. Hence, there is no textual basis for 
concluding that the Secretary’s approval function 
includes a duty, enforceable in an action for money 
damages, to ensure a higher rate of return for the 
tribe concerned. Similarly, no pertinent statutory or 
regulatory provision requires the Secretary, on the 
pain of damages, to conduct an independent 
“economic analysis” of the reasonableness of the 
royalty to which a tribe and a third party have 
agreed.108 
4. Why Justice Ginsberg’s Theory of Indian Agentialism Will 
Fail 
 
 These two federal actions seek to establish a new legal and 
political relationship between America’s ethnic minorities, 
including the Indian peoples, and mainstream American society. 
The Indian peoples and other ethnic minorities are given notice 
that they can no longer function as passive rights holders. They 
must now become active agents, acting on their own behalf, to 
promote and protect their rights, abilities, talents and resources. 
But Justice Ginsberg’s “Indian agentialism” rationale suffers from 
the vice of presuming its result. She failed to take into account the 
widely varying educational, economic and social circumstances of 
America’s many Indian peoples. Put simply, the agential capacity of 
any given Indian peoples is directly correlated to, and to a large 
degree determined by, that particular Indian people’s knowledge 
base and experiential record as it relates to a particular self-
determination endeavor.109 
                                                 
108.  Id. 
109.  See Robert Miller, Economic Development in Indian 
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 Perhaps the Indian peoples should, as Justice Ginsberg’s 
opinion encourages them to do, scrutinize their past dependence on 
their legal trustee, the federal government, to act on their behalf in 
the assertion and protection of their unique rights and entitlements. 
But Ginsberg does not explain how such self-scrutiny will aid the 
Indian peoples in becoming more effective agents on their own 
behalf. Her only oblique suggestion, in this regard, is her bare 
citation to the self-determination language of the IMLA.”110 
 Justice Ginsberg’s Navajo Nation opinion imports, into the 
legally and politically incommensurate Indian self-determination 
context, the well-worn neoliberal claim that today’s ethnic minority 
groups have become overly dependent on federal and state help for 
their economic subsistence. An early academic critic of President 
Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society initiatives, Professor Daniel 
Patrick Moynihan, worried that easy federal or state welfare 
eligibility may condemn America’s ethnic minorities to a multi-
generational cycle of joblessness and single-parent families, 
eventually sapping their individual and collective initiative to do the 
hard work necessary to climb out of poverty. But Moynihan failed, 
as does Ginsberg, to set forth any affirmative program of agential 
development that would restore these damaged groups to a 
contemporary ethic of individual and collective self-regard.111 
 Absent a realistic, governmentally supported, program for 
agential development, these two federal actions—Justice 
Ginsberg’s Navajo Nation opinion and Bill Clinton’s welfare act—
seem merely petty and punitive in nature. No respected authority 
on development theory has claimed that the Indian peoples—
absent substantial financial and technical assistance from their 
trustee—the federal government—can become effective agents of 
self-determination who are capable of negotiating fair mineral 
development agreements with powerful and influential non-Indian 
economic interests.112 Likewise, no respected social welfare thinker 
has argued that today’s welfare “moms and dads,” can effectively 
                                                                                                             
Country: Will Capitalism or Socialism Succeed? 80 OR. L. REV. 1 (Fall 2001). 
110.  Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. at 488. 
111.   See Baca, supra note 99. 
112.  Miller, supra note 109, at 837. 
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transition, without substantial federal financial and technical 
assistance, into effective wage earners, capable of supporting their 
dependent children.”113 
 The dictionary definition of agential success is the personal 
or collective ability to make and carry out informed decision for a 
particular person’s own, as well as for his particular group’s, 
benefit. By all reasonable expert accounts on the subject, the 
putative agent must undergo an extensive program of appropriately 
tailored training and professional mentorship. Given that reality, 
any long term program for agential development must be designed 
around the circumstances and aspirations of particular Indian 
peoples or other targeted ethnic minority groups. 
III. THE SECOND AMERICAN FOUNDING WILL BEGIN 
WITH “SPECIFIC AND LOCALIZED” DIALOGUE 
BETWEEN THE INDIAN AND NON–INDIAN PEOPLES IN 
FAR–FLUNG PLACES SUCH AS  MONTANA 
A. Re-Defining Agential Development as a Shared 
Responsibility of Both Indian and Non-Indian Peoples 
 
 Justice Ginsberg and President Clinton seem to assume that 
agential development is a task borne solely by America’s Indian 
peoples and other ethnic minority groups, and that such an 
endeavor is not a shared responsibility of the American peoples 
generally. Such a mistaken view of agential development will only 
perpetuate the de facto, if not de jure, exclusion of the Indian 
peoples and other ethnic minorities from American civic life. I 
sketch an alternative vision of agential development that will 
hopefully, over the long-term, lead to a “second founding” of the 
American republic. My alternative vision is built around A. K. 
Sen’s “freedom centered” program of agential development. His 
theory of economic and social development focuses on the 
individual’s agential success as the primary instrumental means of 
                                                 
113.  Baca, supra note 99. 
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ensuring a given society’s maturation into a just and well-ordered 
society.114 
 Sen identifies three crucial “freedoms” that form the core of 
his program of individual, as well as group, agential development. 
Sen focuses on a society’s educational system as the primary means 
for instilling the individual understanding, and valuation, of these 
three freedoms as crucial for his or her future individual 
development, as well as for their society’s future development.115 
Both Sen and minority educational advocates rightfully emphasize 
education as the sine qua non for the individual’s meaningful 
exercise of these three agential freedoms. 
 Sen’s crucial individual freedoms are political freedom, 
economic freedom and social freedom.116 First, he contends that 
only the educated individual possesses the capacity to exercise 
political freedom through the informed scrutinizing and criticizing 
of official societal action. Only the educated individual possesses 
the capacity to effectively express his political opinions and beliefs 
through his exercise of the democratic franchise of dialogue, dissent 
and criticism. Second, he maintains that only the educated 
individual possesses the capability to exercise economic freedom 
wisely and responsibly so as to use his personal talents, in 
combination with society’s economic resources, in making his 
consumption, production and exchange decisions. Third, he argues 
that only the educated individual possesses the capacity to interact 
with the larger social community on the basis of mutual respect, 
equality and trust. Only the educated individual possesses the 
capability to make wise use of available social information so as to 
make informed inter-personal judgments and establish meaningful 
life relationships.”117 
 Undoubtedly, many of us—as parents, as educators, or just 
good citizens—already intuitively and instinctively subscribe to 
Sen’s “freedom centered” view of agential development. We may 
further intuitively and instinctively subscribe to Sen’s view that the 
                                                 
114.  Sen, supra note 85 at 145-59. 
115.  Id. 
116.  Id. 
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lack of an education may well diminish a given individual’s 
appreciation and enjoyment of his or her social freedoms. In the 
extreme case, we may also grasp that a given individual’s lack of a 
basic education may amount to the denial of his or her civil or 
human right to become a functioning member of our society. 
Fortunately, Montana has likewise grasped Sen’s pragmatic points 
and it has sought to constitutionally link his “freedom centered” 
view of education to the agential and self-determination rights of 
each individual school child in Montana’s K-12 educational 
system.118 
B. Beginning the Second American Founding In Montana: 
Three Case Studies in Localized and Specialized Agential 
Development 
 
 Clifford Geertz urges us to re-discover “a plurality of ways 
of [societal] belonging and being” that re-establishes a new “sense 
of connectedness that is neither uniform nor comprehensive” so as 
to recognize the multi-ethnic heritage and integrity of 
contemporary America.119 I present three local and specialized case 
studies in agential development that I believe exhibit Geertz’s call 
for new political and legal means for founding a new American 
society. 
 My first case study focuses on Montana’s extraordinary 
constitutional commitment to deliver an “Indian centered” 
education so as to build the agential capabilities of both non-Indian 
and Indian school children within its K-12 educational system. My 
second case study focuses on the newly activist role played by 
Indian political representatives, within Montana’s political system, 
as the agents for building a more open and inclusive democratic 
process within this state. My third case study focuses on the agential 
role played by the Indian lawyers and other professionals in 
                                                 
118.  Raymond Cross, American Indian Education: The Terror of 
History and the Nation’s Debt to the Indian Peoples, 21 UALR L. Rev. 941, 
965-69 (Summer 1999). 
119.  Geertz, supra note 21, at 224. 
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building A. K. Sen’s vision of the just and well-ordered society in 
Montana and elsewhere.120 
1. Case Study One: Montana’s Constitutional Obligation 
to Provide “Indian Education for All” 
 
 My first case study focuses on Montana’s constitutional 
commitment to link Sen’s agential development principles to the 
“on the ground” educational processes and practices within its K-12 
educational system. By adopting Article X, section 1, clause 2, of 
the Montana Constitution of 1972, the peoples of Montana 
declared: “The state recognizes the distinct and unique cultural 
heritage of the American Indians, and it is committed in its 
educational goals to the preservation of their cultural integrity.”121 
 This constitutional recognition of the American Indians’ 
cultural heritage as an integral part of Montana’s educational 
mission has profound agential development implications for the 
reconstruction of elementary and secondary education in Montana. 
This provision, on the one hand, repudiates past state and federal 
Indian educational initiatives that sought to coercively assimilate 
Indian school children into the values and practices of the 
surrounding non-Indian communities.122 This provision, on the 
other hand, positively values the Indian peoples’ cultural and social 
contributions by requiring them to become an integral part of its K-
12 educational system for all Montana’s school children, Indian and 
non-Indian.123 
 But, as is the case with all pragmatic endeavors, the “proof 
of the pudding is in the eating.” Montana faces a daunting financial 
and social challenge in implementing its constitutionally promised 
“Indian education for all.” It has taken some crucial, but tentative, 
first steps towards implementing that provision. The state 
legislature has recently enacted House Bill 528 which encourages 
public school districts, especially those on or near Indian 
                                                 
120.  Sen, supra note 85, at 145-59. 
121.  Cross, supra note 119, at 965-69. 
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reservations and those with large Indian student enrollment, to 
ensure that their certified teaching personnel have an adequate 
grounding in historic and contemporary Indian history and 
culture.124 
 This past legislative session, the state legislature considered, 
but rejected, proposed Indian education legislation that would have 
authorized local school districts to hire Indian teachers 
preferentially under the appropriate circumstances. Other states 
with large Indian populations, such as Minnesota, have already 
adopted such statutes. The Minnesota Indian teacher preference 
statute is part of its larger American Indian Education Act of 
1988.125 
 That act’s preamble cited to current learning theory and 
concluded that Indian school children may benefit from being 
taught by Indian teachers who both grasp and understand their 
distinctive cultural and social learning styles and needs. For these 
practical reasons, the Minnesota Appeals Court upheld the statute 
against an equal protection challenge. The court held Minnesota’s 
Indian teacher preference statute was a rational and logical 
response to the daunting challenge of improving Indian educational 
achievement within that state’s public schools.126 
 Montana has recognized that education will play an 
important role in ensuring the future agential success of both its 
non-Indian and Indian school children. However, the state 
legislature and the state courts have taken only the first steps 
towards realizing its educational mission on behalf of Indian and 
non-Indian school children in Montana.127 
 
 
                                                 
124.  Id. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. 
127.  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the lower 
court’s finding of fact “that Blaine County’s white residents voted as a bloc to 
prevent American Indians from electing their preferred candidates.” See 
United States v. Blaine County, 363 F.3d 897, 900-01 (9th Cir. 2004). 
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2. Case Study Two: Building Indian Political Agency in 
Montana 
 
 Sen’s credo of agential development as the enhancement of 
human freedom requires a given civil society to assist its ethnic or 
cultural minority groups in their explicit recognition and assertion 
of their political interests in both conceptual and practical terms.128 
Only recently have Montana’s Indian peoples sought greater 
political representation in state and local governmental affairs. 
Their new political engagement has required them to learn the 
intricacies and complexities of “hard ball” local and state politics. 
Originally, they sought to achieve greater political representation in 
state and local governmental affairs without the active support or 
help of the state of Montana or the federal courts. But bitter 
experience confirmed that entrenched, non-Indian political 
interests preferred the Indian peoples remain on the political 
sidelines, excluded from any effective political voice in the state 
affairs.129 
 The relatively few Indian representatives in Montana’s 
legislature have understandably sought to leverage their limited 
political influence by establishing common cause and alliances with 
non-Indian legislators who share their values and goals. For 
example, Indian representative Carol Juneau, from the Blackfeet 
Reservation, works with fellow non-Indian legislators to implicitly 
address Indian peoples’ issues under the broader banner of 
“women’s social agency” issues. She recognized that both Indian 
and non-Indian women in Montana seek an improved health care 
and welfare status for themselves and their children.130 
 But achieving a meaningful measure of Indian political 
agency in Montana, as elsewhere, has proven a never ending and 
uphill battle. A brief case study may illustrate this reality. 
Disenfranchised Indian voters challenged Montana’s 1992 state 
                                                 
128.  Sen, supra note 85, at 145-59. 
129.  Id. 
130.  My personal conversations with state representative Carol 
Juneau, who also happens to be my sister, over the course of her tenure in 
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redistricting plan in federal court as violating their electoral rights 
under the 1965 Voting Rights Act.131 Because Montana’s 1972 
Constitution had created a new bipartisan redistricting commission 
and had empowered it to periodically reapportion the state 
legislature, the protection of minority voting rights became the 
constitutional responsibility of that commission.132 
 Given the Indian voters’ pending federal lawsuits, 
Montana’s 1999 legislative redistricting commission began its work 
under the watchful eye of federal judge Pro. He expressed his 
fulsome confidence that the state commission would “preserve the 
orderly administration of elections and encourage the highest 
possible participation by the [Indian] electorate and potential 
                                                 
131. The named Indian plaintiffs contended that Montana’s 1992 
legislative redistricting plan for the House of Representatives and Senate 
unfairly diluted the voting strength of American Indian voters and was 
adopted with a discriminatory purpose, thereby violating the Voting Rights 
Act of 1965. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, in significant part, 
the lower court’s judgment in favor of Montana’s Governor and Secretary of 
State. See Old Person v. Cooney, 230 F.2d 1113 (9th Cir. 2000). Although the 
appeals court affirmed the lower court’s ruling that the Indian plaintiffs had 
not demonstrated that Montana’s 1992 legislative redistricting plan was 
adopted with a discriminatory purpose, it also held the lower court had erred 
in its application of the relevant law to other aspects of the plaintiffs’ legal 
claims. Id. at 1131. That court also concluded that the lower court erred in 
finding proportionality between the number of state legislative districts in 
which Indian voters constituted an effective majority and the American Indian 
share of the voting age population of Montana. Id. 
132.  Indeed, federal district judge, Philip M. Pro, upon remand of 
the Old Person proceedings to the lower court for further action, judicially 
acknowledged the vital “role of the 2000 Montana [legislative redistricting] 
Commission in fashioning a viable remedy” to address the Indian plaintiffs’ 
complaints in the Old Person case. See Old Person v. Brown, 182 F. Supp. 2d 
1002, 1015 (D. Mont. 2002). The Indian plaintiffs offered statements by 
Montana’s Attorney General and the 2000 Montana Commission as 
“admission[s] of a Voting Rights Act violation with regards to the particular 
House and Senate Districts at issue in the case.” Id. at 1015. While Judge Pro 
found these proffered hearsay statements to be “undeniably trustworthy and 
relevant to the proceedings,” he did not deem them tantamount to the state’s 
admission that it had violated the 1965 Voting Rights Act. Id. 
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[Indian] candidates.”133 Astute political insiders, such as Assistant 
Attorney General Sarah Bond, interpreted the judge’s remark as 
encouraging the commission to be highly attuned to the political 
aspirations of the state’s Indian electorate.134 
 The state commission’s proposed plan, known as Plan 300, 
sought to address the Indian voters’ representational concerns by 
increasing the number of “Indian majority” voting districts from six 
to nine. But not everyone was thrilled with “Plan 300.” Montana’s 
Republicans, who controlled both houses of the state legislature, 
complained the plan was both mathematically and democratically 
flawed, as seeming to favor potential Democratic political 
candidates. Indian leaders, such as Mr. Bruce Sun Child, Vice Chair 
of the Chippewa-Cree Tribal Council, applauded the proposed 
redistricting plan, saying: “It won’t cause injustice, it will restore 
justice.”135 
 State Republican leaders disagreed, and hastily enacted a 
new state law prohibiting the Secretary of State from accepting any 
legislative redistricting plan that deviated by more than one-percent 
from the mathematically equal legislative district of 9.022 residents. 
Because the commission’s plan allowed up to a five-percent 
deviation from such equally sized districts, it facially violated the 
new enacted state law on the matter. Achieving greater Indian 
political agency in Montana fell into hands of a state district judge, 
the Honorable Dorothy McCarter. She struck down the new state 
law as an unconstitutional interference with the commission’s 
express constitutional authority and duties.136 
 
                                                 
133. Judge Pro declined to judicially compel partial legislative 
redistricting because such action may impair the on-going deliberations and 
functions of that commission. Id. at 1019. 
134. Id. 
135. See Summary Minutes of Hearing on HB 309 3 (Jan. 17, 
2003). 
136. See Let New Legislative Redistricting Plan Stand, Great 
Falls Tribune (July 14, 2003). 
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3. Case Study Three: Building Indian Legal Agency in 
Montana and Elsewhere 
 
 Legal agency—the independent capacity and power of the 
Indian peoples to assert and protect their legal rights—is a recent 
phenomenon.137 Indeed, much of modern Indian case and statutory 
law has been created by the Indian peoples’ increasingly effective 
exercise of their newly confirmed legal agential powers. The recent 
spate of breach of trust lawsuits brought by the Indian peoples 
against their putative trustee, the federal government, for the mal-
administration of their trust resources exhibits the reality of their 
new agential status.138 Furthermore, modern American civil rights 
law was literally created by hitherto excluded ethnic minorities who 
asserted their new agential status through lawsuits against those 
federal and state officials who had long denied them the exercise of 
their fundamental personal civil rights and liberties.139 
 But making legal agency a working reality for the Indian 
peoples and the other American ethnic minority groups requires 
the resolution of that threshold question initially recognized during 
the late 1960s and early 1970s. To paraphrase, where are those 
Indian and other ethnic minority lawyers who intrinsically grasp 
their communities’ underlying legal and social needs so as to 
competently represent their interests before the courts, 
administrative agencies and legislatures? The resounding practical 
retort given to this question was: “There are none!”140 
 The same negative response was given when that question 
was asked in other important Indian or minority agential contexts. 
                                                 
137. Professor David Getches attributes this, in part, to the 
success of the Pre-Law Summer Institute, at the University of New Mexico. 
Getches, supra note 90 at 19. Beginning in 1967, this BIA and congressionally 
supported programs has, as of 1993, provided financial and other assistance 
“to over one-half of the 1500 Native American attorneys nationwide...” Id. at 
19-20. 
138. Cobell v. Babbitt, 91 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1999). 
139. Getches, supra note 90, at 19. 
140. Philip S. Deloria, The American Indian Law Center: An 
Informal History, 24 N.M. L. REV. 285 (Spring 1994). 
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There, the response was: there are too few Indian or ethnic 
minority medical doctors, elementary teachers, academics, 
engineers, scientists, or social workers to create the critical mass of 
agents needed to rebuild those shattered communities. How do we 
quickly create those Indian and ethnic minority professionals who 
will give flesh and blood content to the rhetorical idea of agential 
competence within their respective communities?141 
 In the late 1960s, this reality spurred the BIA, and other 
federal Indian action agencies, to institute several important Indian 
affirmative action programs.142 These programs’ avowed purpose 
was to quickly produce a critical mass of Indian lawyers, as well as 
other important Indian professionals, so as to give reality to the 
concept of Indian agential power. A similar empirical reality 
spurred President Lyndon Johnson to sign an executive order in 
1965 requiring federal agencies and their contractors to develop 
affirmative action programs designed to create new agential 
opportunities for qualified ethnic minority individuals, businesses 
and organizations.143 President Johnson’s express goal in endorsing 
affirmative action as a federal goal was to give representational 
reality to the historic American ideal of equal opportunity under 
the law.144 
 But the intervening years have witnessed a significant 
rollback in both federal Indian and ethnic minority affirmative 
action programs. Both the judicial and executive branches of the 
federal government have questioned the legality and social efficacy 
of racially targeted federal and state government’s affirmative 
action programs.145 Some newly minted ethnic minority academics 
have claimed that these programs unfairly stigmatize those very 
minority individuals they were intended to benefit.146 
 This rollback has substantially blunted, but has not 
completely derailed, the significant agential contributions made by 
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those newly minted Indian and ethnic minority professionals in 
their respective communities in America. Without these new Indian 
lawyers, and other newly minted Indian professionals, it is doubtful 
that Indian self-determination gains made in the past three decades 
would have been possible in America’s Indian reservations and in 
the many urban Indian communities. Nor has this rollback silenced 
the on-going political and legal debate over these issues within an 
increasingly multi-cultural and multi-racial America. 
C. Summary: Placing These Three Case Studies in Context 
 
 These three case studies provide modest evidence that my 
hypothesized agential revolution may already be underway in 
America. If so, its success stems from, I believe, the average 
American’s recognition that only by embracing the principles of 
deep diversity will America successfully adapt to the globalized 
economy and “world culture” of the future. By welcoming the 
Indian peoples, as contemporary cultural and political forces to be 
reckoned with, Montana can provide practical and realistic 
approaches as to how other American localities and regions may 
work with other ethnic and cultural groups within their borders. 
Deep diversity, when viewed from this pragmatic perspective, 
furthers the economic and political self-interest of non-Indian 
America. 
 Meaningful cultural and social change grows from below 
and slowly infiltrates and alters the institutional features of a given 
society. Is there evidence that principles of deep diversity have 
infiltrated our American institutions so as to modify their basic 
processes and practices? In my conclusion I briefly evaluate a 
recent Supreme Court decision suggesting that principles of deep 
diversity have infiltrated our most significant foundational 
document—the United States Constitution. 
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IV. THE USES AND MIS–USES OF DIVERSITY THEORY 
AND PRACTICE: WHY THE SECOND AMERICAN 
FOUNDING REQUIRES A BOTTOM–UP RATHER TOP–
DOWN STRATEGY  
 
 Ecological historian Tim Flannery argues it was the Indian 
peoples who taught non-Indian settlers how to tame, and ultimately 
conquer, the American frontier.147 Conquering the next great 
American frontier—that of founding a just and equitable society—
will also require the Indian people’s active participation and 
assistance. Demographers maintain that by 2050 the United States 
will become, as the states of California and New Mexico already 
have become, a minority-majority nation. Diversity, for better or 
worse, has already created a poly-ethnic and poly-cultural America. 
Just as the Indians taught the starving Pilgrim immigrants of 
Plymouth Colony how to adapt to a harsh land, so too can today’s 
America’s ethnic and cultural minorities help teach non-Indians 
how to adapt to their new political and social roles in the America 
of 2050. 
 My conviction is that America’s future adaptation to 
diversity will be best realized through localized and graduated 
initiatives, similar to those now on-going between the Indian and 
non-Indian peoples of Montana, that compel political dialogue and 
mutual political accommodation so as to resolve local conflicts. 
Furthermore, I believe that a bottom-up approach to resolving 
potential ethnic and cultural conflicts will likely produce more 
realistic and sustainable outcomes than any other alternative. The 
past desultory history of top-down approaches—whether 
legislative, judicial or regulatory—to the resolution of diversity 
based concerns and conflicts seems to justify this approach. 
 National level discussions tend to focus on the deep legal 
thinking required to make diversity compatible with the equal 
protection clause of the Constitution. Nowhere is this conceptual 
struggle more evident than in the recent Supreme Court decision 
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upholding diversity-based admissions programs in America’s public 
colleges and universities.148 Some commentators argue that the 
Court’s slim majority was swayed by the “occupational need” 
rationale for diversity, rather than by any deep re-theorizing of the 
equal protection clause. By this view, Justice O’Connor and her 
colleagues took a “common sense” approach to resolving the 
thorny constitutional issues in this case. One commentator, Bryan 
W. Leach, emphasizes the functional value of diversity as (a/the) 
crucial factor in the majority’s decision: 
 
After reviewing the pedagogical benefits of 
diversity, the Grutter majority turned to another line 
of arguments that in its view “further bolstered” the 
law school’s claim of a compelling state interest. 
What these arguments shared in common was their 
recognition of the important role that universities 
play in preparing students to succeed in their chosen 
professions. Specifically, the Court described the 
pressing need for tomorrow’s leaders to interact 
capably with peoples from diverse cultural 
backgrounds. In order to cultivate these skills, 
students should be “expos[ed] to widely diverse 
peoples, cultures, ideas and viewpoints.” The Court 
did not dwell on the importance of racial sensitivity 
as a virtue in its own right. Rather, the development 
of greater cross-racial understanding was 
characterized as a means of promoting the smooth 
functioning of “today’s increasingly global 
marketplace,” preserving “the military’s ability to 
fulfill its principle [sic] mission to provide national 
security” and cultivating a set of political and 
judicial leaders “with legitimacy in eyes of the 
citizenry.”149 
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 Some other commentators have criticized the Court’s 
proffered, functionally based rationales for diversity as both cynical 
and banal. While I share some of that sentiment, explaining 
diversity in terms of the economic and security focused self-interest 
of today’s non-Indian majority does make practical sense. Down 
the road, once the non-Indians’ “fear and prudence” concerns 
about diversity are allayed; a deeper dialogue about the moral and 
ethical significance of the “second American founding” can be 
broached. As with so many things in societal life, patience may 
prove to be a virtue in this endeavor. 
